`isGeneratedFile` was path-only, but Go's own convention is a CONTENT
marker (`// Code generated by <tool>. DO NOT EDIT.`), not a filename one.
A Go monorepo with generated CRUD in ordinarily-named files sitting beside
hand-written use-cases was therefore invisible to every generated-file
down-rank in the codebase — that is #1500.
Measured on kubernetes/client-go (2,453 Go files): the canonical banner
appears in 2,001 of them, the path check flags 0, the new content check
flags exactly those 2,001 — no false positives, no misses.
Design: decide at INDEX time (content is already in memory for parsing),
persist on `files.generated`, read from the DB. Explore never reads file
headers per request.
- `hasGeneratedHeader(content)` recognizes the standard banners — Go's,
protoc's, `@generated`, `<auto-generated>`, Thrift, OpenAPI Generator,
FlatBuffers, bindgen, ANTLR. Precision-first and fenced three ways: an
8KB/60-line header window, a comment-line requirement (leader or open
block comment), and markers tight enough that prose can't trip them. A
generator's own source, holding the banner as a string constant in its
body, is not flagged; neither is this module itself (pinned by test).
- `isGeneratedFile(path)` is unchanged — cheap, sync, still the fallback.
- Schema v9 adds `files.generated` + a PARTIAL index. DDL only, no
backfill: the flag derives from content the migration cannot see, so
rows stay 0 until a re-index and every reader unions the flag with the
path check — an un-migrated index keeps pre-#1500 behavior rather than
regressing. Re-index required; noted in the CHANGELOG.
- `generatedPredicateFor(paths)` gives ranking a bounded probe + O(1)
lookups. Bounded, not cached: no invalidation, so a ranking call can
never serve a verdict the last sync already replaced. Wired into explore
ranking, findSymbolMatches, findAllSymbols, search (MCP + CLI), the
context formatter, and the dominant-file/route-file hygiene filters.
Cost (acceptance bar was no measurable index-time regression): a single
unanchored `/generat/i` test over the header rejects ~every hand-written
file before any line splitting. 4.6 µs/file on client-go (worst case —
82% generated). End-to-end `codegraph init` on client-go, n=3 alternating
arms: 5.73s median with detection vs 5.76s path-only baseline; the arms
cross over between runs, so the difference is inside run-to-run noise.
Scope note: generated status remains a stable TIEBREAK at equal score,
exactly where it was. Making it a strong negative signal is CG-10, which
this unblocks by making the signal correct and available.
Two pre-existing tests hard-coded schema version 8; both now track
CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION (or the migration table) so future migrations
don't require editing them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The directory walk deliberately follows an in-root symlink whose target
lives outside the repo root (the standard Dota custom-game layout, where
`game/` and `content/` link into the SDK tree) and enumerates the files
under it. But the read path then rejected every one of them via the
strict symlink-escape guard, logging `Path traversal blocked in batch
reader` and indexing nothing — discovery and the reader disagreed.
Add an opt-in `allowSymlinkEscape` to validatePathWithinRoot that waives
only the realpath-escape rejection (the lexical `../` guard still
applies) and pass it at the three indexing read sites (batch reader,
indexFile, indexFileWithContent). The content-serving sinks
(ContextBuilder, MCP tools) keep the strict guard, so this stays inside
the #527 model: indexing now follows the symlink, getCode still refuses
to serve out-of-root contents.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): resolve symlinks in path validation to block out-of-root reads (#527)
validatePathWithinRoot was purely lexical (path.resolve + startsWith), so an
in-repo symlink whose logical path is inside the project root but whose real
target escapes it passed validation — and both content-serving read sinks
(codegraph_node includeCode, codegraph_explore source) then readFileSync'd it,
leaking out-of-root file contents (e.g. ~/.ssh, /etc) to the agent.
Add a realpath layer: after the lexical check, resolve symlinks on both the
candidate path and the root and re-compare, rejecting anything whose real path
escapes the root. An in-root symlink is still allowed (no over-blocking).
Comparison is case-insensitive on Windows (NTFS + realpath casing). Not-yet-
existing paths (ENOENT) fall back to the lexical result so about-to-be-written
files still validate; other resolution errors reject.
Removes the dead, never-called isPathWithinRoot / isPathWithinRootReal helpers
(the latter a footgun — it returned true on realpath failure). Adds RED->GREEN
tests: in->out file/dir symlinks rejected, in->in allowed, ../ rejected, ENOENT
allowed, plus an end-to-end test proving getCode no longer serves an out-of-root
file reached through a dir symlink.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(changelog): note the #527 symlink path-escape fix
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
Completes the explore-overhaul arc: `codegraph_explore` becomes the single primary tool an agent reaches for, and its coverage + output shape are tuned so flow/architecture questions resolve with near-zero Read/Grep.
### What changed
- **explore is the sole primary tool** — removed `codegraph_context` (the fuzzy-input Read-trigger) and `codegraph_trace` (under-picked by agents); explore already surfaces the call flow among the symbols you name. A plain natural-language question now works as the query.
- **Store/handler coverage** — functions defined inside object literals (Zustand `create((set, get) => ({ … }))`, Redux/Pinia/MobX, exported handler/route maps) are indexed as real symbols, including calls through `useStore.getState().fn()` and destructured `const { fn } = useStore.getState()`. A general AST rule, not a per-lib hack.
- **Overload disambiguation** — explore leads with the *right* definition when a method name is overloaded across types (a PascalCase type token in the query biases to that type's own def); `codegraph_node` returns *every* overload's body in one call, with an optional `file`/`line` selector to pin one.
- **Method-atomic render** — explore never returns half a method; at the size budget it drops whole methods/files (and lists what it dropped) instead of truncating a body mid-method.
- **Native-read-shaped output** — per-call output is capped to ~24K with a 25K hard ceiling and concentrated into ~150–250-line flow windows, mirroring how the agent natively reads; repo size scales the *call* budget, not the per-call size (a larger response just gets externalized to a file the host Reads back).
- **Blast radius** folded into explore (dependents + covering tests, locations only).
### Benchmark (refreshed on this build)
Re-validated the 7-repo A/B on 2026-06-02 (Opus 4.8, effort=high, median of 4). WITH arm re-measured on this build, WITHOUT reused:
**~16% cheaper · 47% fewer tokens · 22% faster · 58% fewer tool calls** — 0 file reads on 6 of 7 repos (Gin ~1).
The arc trades larger, cache-heavy explore responses for guaranteed near-zero reads, so cost/token margins soften vs the prior build (Excalidraw and Tokio land at cost break-even) while time and tool-calls stay clear wins everywhere — consistent with the project's stated optimization target (latency + tool-calls, not token cost).
### Validation
- Full suite green: **1112 passed, 2 skipped**.
- 28/28 plain WITH runs across the 7 README repos completed clean; reads median 0 on 6/7.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Validate projectPath in getCodeGraph so MCP clients can't open a codegraph in a
sensitive system directory. Guarded with existsSync so nested/not-yet-created
sub-paths still resolve up to the default project (preserves issue #238). Adds
MCP-handler rejection tests (POSIX + Windows-gated); validated on a real
Windows 11 VM.
Closes#230
Drop the no-op try/catch around insertNode.run, and lowercase the Windows
SENSITIVE_PATHS entries so validateProjectPath's case-insensitive check
actually blocks c:\windows. Adds a validateProjectPath test (POSIX +
Windows-gated); the Windows-gated case was validated on a real Windows 11 VM.
Closes#327
Route handleContext's output through the shared truncateOutput cap
(MAX_OUTPUT_LENGTH) so codegraph_context can no longer blow past the context
budget — every sibling MCP tool already truncates; this was the one uncapped
output path.
Closes#296
Co-authored-by: Baijack-star <71923891+Baijack-star@users.noreply.github.com>
Remove .codegraph/config.json and the entire config surface. CodeGraph now
indexes every file whose extension maps to a supported language and respects
.gitignore everywhere — git repos via git itself, non-git projects via the
`ignore` library (root + nested .gitignore files, the same way git does).
- Remove CodeGraphConfig/DEFAULT_CONFIG, src/config.ts, and the public config
API (the `config` option on init, getConfig/updateConfig/getConfigPath).
- Derive the source-file allowlist from EXTENSION_MAP (isSourceFile); maxFileSize
is now a constant. Drop the .codegraphignore marker.
- Behavior change: committed, non-gitignored dirs (vendor/, a committed dist/)
are now indexed — .gitignore is the single source of truth.
Earlier inert fields (languages, frameworks, extractDocstrings, trackCallSites,
customPatterns) and their dead helpers are removed as part of this.
Resolves#283.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`markSessionConsulted` writes `${tmpdir()}/codegraph-consulted-${hash}` on
every `codegraph_context` call so external tooling can detect that an MCP
session has consulted CodeGraph. The old `writeFileSync` followed symlinks
unconditionally, so on a multi-user system any other local user could
pre-create that marker path as a symlink pointing at a victim-writable
file — the next codegraph context call would then overwrite the target's
contents with the ISO timestamp string (CWE-59).
The session-id hash gates predictability and makes opportunistic exploit
infeasible on its own, but tmpdir() is world-writable (mode 1777 on Linux)
and the proper pattern is to never follow links into a shared-prefix
tmpfile. Switch to `openSync` with O_NOFOLLOW + mode 0o600. ELOOP from a
planted symlink lands in the existing silent-fail catch — refuse to write
rather than touch an attacker-chosen target.
Detected by Aeon + manual review.
Severity: medium
CWE-59 (link following), CWE-732 (incorrect permission for critical resource)
Co-authored-by: aaronjmars <aaron@aeon.local>
- Add validateProjectPath() to reject sensitive system directories
- Add isPathWithinRoot/isPathWithinRootReal for symlink-aware path checks
- Replace hand-rolled glob-to-regex with picomatch to prevent ReDoS
- Add isSafeRegex() to reject custom patterns with nested quantifiers
- Replace FileLock with PID-tracking version that detects stale locks
- Add symlink detection in removeDirectory/listDirectoryContents
- Add subdirectory name validation in ensureSubdirectory
- Add atomicWriteFileSync and corrupted file backup in config-writer
- Add MCP input validation (validateString) for all tool handlers
- Fix CLAUDE.md section replacement to handle ### subsections correctly