Remove .codegraph/config.json and the entire config surface. CodeGraph now
indexes every file whose extension maps to a supported language and respects
.gitignore everywhere — git repos via git itself, non-git projects via the
`ignore` library (root + nested .gitignore files, the same way git does).
- Remove CodeGraphConfig/DEFAULT_CONFIG, src/config.ts, and the public config
API (the `config` option on init, getConfig/updateConfig/getConfigPath).
- Derive the source-file allowlist from EXTENSION_MAP (isSourceFile); maxFileSize
is now a constant. Drop the .codegraphignore marker.
- Behavior change: committed, non-gitignored dirs (vendor/, a committed dist/)
are now indexed — .gitignore is the single source of truth.
Earlier inert fields (languages, frameworks, extractDocstrings, trackCallSites,
customPatterns) and their dead helpers are removed as part of this.
Resolves#283.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`markSessionConsulted` writes `${tmpdir()}/codegraph-consulted-${hash}` on
every `codegraph_context` call so external tooling can detect that an MCP
session has consulted CodeGraph. The old `writeFileSync` followed symlinks
unconditionally, so on a multi-user system any other local user could
pre-create that marker path as a symlink pointing at a victim-writable
file — the next codegraph context call would then overwrite the target's
contents with the ISO timestamp string (CWE-59).
The session-id hash gates predictability and makes opportunistic exploit
infeasible on its own, but tmpdir() is world-writable (mode 1777 on Linux)
and the proper pattern is to never follow links into a shared-prefix
tmpfile. Switch to `openSync` with O_NOFOLLOW + mode 0o600. ELOOP from a
planted symlink lands in the existing silent-fail catch — refuse to write
rather than touch an attacker-chosen target.
Detected by Aeon + manual review.
Severity: medium
CWE-59 (link following), CWE-732 (incorrect permission for critical resource)
Co-authored-by: aaronjmars <aaron@aeon.local>
- Add validateProjectPath() to reject sensitive system directories
- Add isPathWithinRoot/isPathWithinRootReal for symlink-aware path checks
- Replace hand-rolled glob-to-regex with picomatch to prevent ReDoS
- Add isSafeRegex() to reject custom patterns with nested quantifiers
- Replace FileLock with PID-tracking version that detects stale locks
- Add symlink detection in removeDirectory/listDirectoryContents
- Add subdirectory name validation in ensureSubdirectory
- Add atomicWriteFileSync and corrupted file backup in config-writer
- Add MCP input validation (validateString) for all tool handlers
- Fix CLAUDE.md section replacement to handle ### subsections correctly
Martin Oehlert