Spring `application.{properties,yml}` keys (and Shopify Liquid `{% schema %}`
blocks) were storing the config VALUE in the node docstring, and
`codegraph_explore`'s source section re-read the raw `key = value` line off
disk — so a secret committed to a config file (DB password, API key, JDBC URL
with embedded credentials) could be pushed into an agent's context via
explore/node output without the agent ever opening the file.
Config-leaf nodes (`kind: 'constant'` in a config language) now surface the KEY
only, via a shared `isConfigLeafNode` predicate applied at both surfacing
paths: the value is dropped from extraction, `getCode`/`includeCode` returns
the key instead of the file line, and explore excludes config leaves from
source rendering. The predicate can't match real code (real constants are
ts/java/go/…), so `@Value`/`@ConfigurationProperties` resolution and impact are
unaffected. Adds a regression test asserting a planted secret never appears in
`codegraph_explore` / `codegraph_node` output while the keys still resolve.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
80db274e5f
commit
112e278b5c
@@ -335,7 +335,12 @@ function extractSpringConfig(
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endColumn: valueText.length,
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language: lang,
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signature: dottedKey,
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docstring: valueText.slice(0, 200),
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// SECURITY (#383): store the KEY only, never the value. Config files
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// routinely hold secrets (DB passwords, API keys, JDBC URLs with embedded
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// credentials), and surfacing the value here pushes it into agent context
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// unbidden (it lands in codegraph_node/explore output via the docstring).
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// The key is all `@Value`/`@ConfigurationProperties` resolution needs; an
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// agent that genuinely needs a value can read the file directly.
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updatedAt: now,
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});
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};
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